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ABSTRACT: This article discusses the regional and international
security implications of the June 2016 referendum vote that Britain
leave the European Union. This essay proposes Brexit creates
opportunities for greater cooperation within the NATO alliance and
bilaterally with the United States.

T

he dramatically close vote in the United Kingdom on June 23,
2016, regarding the European Union (EU) referendum continues
to reverberate. Referred to as “Brexit,” the narrow decision to
withdraw from the organization revealed a nation sharply divided. Public
opinion polls and media information mistakenly predicted the vote
would support remaining with Europe. Moreover, recent polls wrongly
predicting British election outcomes also indicate the public at large
remains unsettled. The same uncertainty is true for political leaders. While
the bulk of public discussion and political negotiation resulting from the
vote focuses on the economic dimensions and the relationships between
Britain and the continent of Europe, the new state of affairs is also
significant for defense and security concerns, transatlantic relationships,
and the existing international system.1
The failure of Prime Minister David Cameron to secure an
affirmative vote on the referendum resulted in his almost immediate
resignation and the formation of a new Conservative Party government.
Ironically, the 2015 general election had already created a Conservative
majority in the House of Commons, ending the need for a coalition
with the Liberal Democrats that had governed from 2010 to 2015.
Had the Conservatives maintained the coalition, and its associated
collegiality, the referendum might have successfully confirmed the proEurope stance of the Liberal Democrats and the predecessor Liberal
Party. In contrast, Cameron’s successor, Prime Minister Theresa May, a
Conservative, has been explicit—indeed emphatic—about withdrawing
from the EU, a course with significant political as well as economic
dimensions and risks.
The relatively subtle military implications of abrogating Britain’s
involvement in the European Union vary. The Union sponsors limited
military missions, some of which extend well beyond the geography of
Europe. More important to the organization are coordinating efforts and
sharing information related to national security, especially in intelligence
realms. Britain’s role in this effort arises from its distinctive expertise in
military defense and security associated with centuries of policing their
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global empire and managing guerrilla and other unconventional wars
currently described as “low-intensity conflicts.”
The Economist published an insightful, indeed prescient, analysis
of the security concerns involved with the referendum a month before
the vote. In it, then-Home Secretary Theresa May noted the European
arrest warrant and access to intelligence data are important arguments
for remaining within the collaborative. In the same section, Lord
Jonathan Evans and Sir John Sawers, former heads of Britain’s domestic
and overseas intelligence agencies, expressed the loss of shared data
and general collaboration constituted strong arguments against Brexit.
Pauline Neville-Jones, a former national security adviser, likewise
warned that leaving the European Union would weaken police
cooperation and border control.
The future prime minister and former intelligence and security
officials were reacting to a controversial statement by Sir Richard
Dearlove, another retired foreign intelligence head, who observed,
“The truth about Brexit from a national security perspective is that the
cost to Britain would be low.” 2 Others also argue the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Five Eyes intelligence network—
comprised of Australia, Britain, Canada, New Zealand, and the United
States—provide a durable continuing structure for defense cooperation
to overcome the intelligence concerns.
Additionally, Brexit supporters are suspicious of the Union’s relatively open borders, of EU administrators and officials interfering
in Britain’s national defense, and of losing national sovereignty to
the European Court of Justice. In fact, the fundamental purpose of
the region’s supranational economic institutions is to discourage
nationalism, and consequent militarism, primarily through indirect
commercial means. The goal, though not the means, of European
integration, since fully including Germany into the regional economy
of Europe after World War II, is to make war less likely. And, thus, the
Union’s willingness to undertake limited multilateral military missions
as far as Indonesia indicates the fading of nationalism in Europe.
The immediate area of potential challenge for Britain, and
danger for Anglo-American relations, arguably lies in and around
Protestant-dominated Northern Ireland. Since Ireland’s independence
in 1921, peace in the region has been fragile. After the Irish Republican
Army renewed violence in the late 1960s, Britain undertook a long,
complex process of diplomacy and counterinsurgency that led to the
Good Friday Agreement, announced on April 10, 1998. Comprised of
two documents, the agreement describes governing arrangements for
Northern Ireland to bring Catholic and Protestant elements together
and to guarantee the new structure, which collapsed in late 2016 because
of a continuing controversy over heating fuel.3
Since Britain and Ireland are members of the European Union,
Brexit directly undercuts the broader foundation of political stability as
well as economic cooperation governing Northern Ireland even further.
Britain will remain a committed member of NATO, maintaining military
2      “Brexit Brief: Security Concerns,” Economist, May 14, 2016, 49.
3      Amanda Ferguson, “Cracks Exposed at Heart of Northern Irish Peace by ‘Cash-for-Ash’
Scandal,” Reuters, January 10, 2017.
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modernization programs in the face of budget stringencies. And Ireland
will sustain its military neutrality, established prior to World War II,
as a result of the traditional conflict with Britain. Although reciprocal
international investment in this part of the region is possible, Britain’s
withdrawal from the European Union almost certainly will bring new
barriers to such trade.
In contrast to its relationship with Ireland, Britain has had close
ties with the United States since America abandoned its traditional
isolationism in World War II. Moreover, Brexit allows Britain to
cooperate beyond the European Union. This freedom could support
more effective collaborative partnerships to prevent controversial
outcomes, such as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, and to safeguard
intelligence such as the photographs related to the Manchester Arena
attack and classified information.4 Yet both countries should also heed
President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s famous warning about the dangers
of a “military-industrial complex.” 5

British Roles

Understanding the consequences of Brexit on NATO, Anglo-Irish
relations, and Anglo-American relations in the context of history is
particularly important. Britain’s traditional posture regarding Europe,
in terms of both commerce and military security, involves only partial
engagement. A European Union without Britain would naturally divert
more attention toward NATO, an established institution for European
cooperation. This trend is especially likely given the twin challenges
of Islamic terrorism within and beyond Europe and the territorial
expansion of Russia into Crimea, Georgia, and Ukraine. Directly across
the Mediterranean Sea, the complexity becomes more apparent as the
Assad regime in Syria, with vital military support from its ally Russia,
has defeated a diverse array of opposing rebel forces, including elements
of the Islamic State.
Britain’s exceptionally long record of engagement and leadership
in international relations—including economic coordination with
purely military dimensions and the vexing, and at times violent, history
among Britain, Ireland, and Northern Ireland—bears directly on
contemporary concerns regarding global terrorism. Britain’s roots of
flexible internationalism transcend domestic party politics.
Though a diplomatic leader within Europe, Britain did not initially
seek entry into the European Economic Community. After two painful
vetoes over a decade by nationalist President Charles de Gaulle of
France, Britain did achieve membership in 1973; however, it has never
adopted the Euro. Thus, Brexit is only the latest development in the
nation’s long-standing economic ambiguity.
4      Ewan MacAskill, “UK Faces Massive Rise in Costs to Fix Stealth Fighter,” Guardian,
February 4, 2017; Gordon Rayner and Robert Mendick, “Pictures Leaked ‘after Being Shared
with US Intelligence’ Show Bomb Used in Manchester Attack,” Telegraph, May 24, 2017; and
Andrew Rafferty and Ken Dilanian, “Report: President Trump Revealed Classified Information
to Russia,” NBC News, May 15, 2017, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news
/report-president-trump-revealed-classified-information-russia-n759846.
5      Dwight D. Eisenhower, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960–1961, Public Papers of the Presidents
of the United States (Washington, DC: Office of the Federal Register, 1961), 1035–40; and
“Eisenhower’s Farewell Address, 1961,” American Experience, accessed April 23, 2018, http:
//www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/eisenhower-farewell/.
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Outside Europe, the long history of diplomatic and military
cooperation between the United Kingdom and the United States, known
as the “Special Relationship,” has both complicated relations between
the two nations and provided each ally a relatively strong, though not
always obvious, influence with the other. This close relationship, and
its emotional component, not only magnify frictions but also make
policy agreements and wider approaches relatively durable. Notably,
the strength and complexity of each nation’s reliance emerges in the
complementary and collaborative realm of intelligence associated with
information collection and military action.
The broad compatibility of domestic political institutions and
cultural backdrops helps to explain this phenomenon. These dimensions
provide a device to transcend particular tensions by drawing attention to
the more general accord. The cultural ties between Britain and America
were among Winston Churchill’s favorite rhetorical tools. In one
important speech, he dramatically described the emerging Cold War
and the “iron curtain” descending across Europe, and petitioned the
“fraternal association” of English-speaking peoples.6 Equally relevant,
President Franklin D. Roosevelt handpicked William J. Donovan, a
gifted intelligence operative during the 1940s, to serve as a liaison to
Britain and shape the Office of Strategic Services, which evolved into
today’s Central Intelligence Agency.
Thus, the great ordeal of World War II made possible the vital
bilateral partnership, which has proven durable so far. But that seminal
experience, like most important understandings, was built on a history
of mutual accommodation; the primary features remained largely
inexplicit. Historian Herbert G. Nicholas describes “the steady spread
of the idea” after World War I that the two nations would avoid armed
conflict with one another.7  Some contemporary analysts argue this
partnership is weak, reflected in tensions on the ground in Afghanistan
and Iraq.8 The details of collaboration, however, are always difficult, and
durable partnerships involve broadly similar worldviews that encourage
cooperation. In the trying circumstances of war, therefore, clashes
between allies are to be expected.

Transatlantic Trends

While Americans tend to prefer clear conceptual demarcations and
sometimes sudden, sharp strategic reversals, the British approach to
foreign policy emphasizes evolution and instrumentalism. Throughout
the Cold War, American foreign policy planners and decision-makers
oscillated between alarm about Soviet bloc military power and a desire
to reshape the international environment drastically. By contrast, in
defense and strategic policies, as in general diplomacy, the British tried
to maintain the traditional approach of working within and adjusting to
the global status quo at the margins.
6      Winston S. Churchill, “The Sinews of Peace” (speech, Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri,
March 5, 1946), https://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1946/s460305a_e.htm; and Leon D. Epstein,
Britain: Uneasy Ally (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), 13.
7     Herbert G. Nicholas, Britain and the U.S.A. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1963), 22.
8     Andrew Mumford, Counterinsurgency Wars and the Anglo-American Alliance: The Special Relationship
on the Rocks (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2017).
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In the early 1960s, the new Kennedy administration substantially
expanded defense spending across the board and emphasized
quantitative analysis. The American fondness for, and emphasis on,
technology found expression in technocrats personified by Secretary
of Defense Robert S. McNamara and his associates. By contrast, the
previous Eisenhower administration had emphasized practical budget
discipline over abstract conceptualization. This approach applied to
defense spending, particularly for the Army.
The Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations emphasized negotiation and détente with the Soviet Union and China. Conversely, President
Ronald Reagan’s first-term administration substantially expanded
military spending and capabilities, including strategic nuclear weapons.
This posture, reminiscent of the Kennedy administration, reflected
long-term growth of parallel Soviet military power. During his second
term, Reagan renewed the emphasis on arms control agreements.9
In keeping with established American practices of substantial—
at times radical—shifts in military policies, these conceptual and
organizational innovations were not always coordinated. In 1986,
the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act
introduced the greatest military reorganization since the National
Security Act of 1947, which unified the services under the Department
of Defense. The president and the secretary of defense assumed direct
authority over unified military combatant commands, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff assumed advisory and training roles, and the chairman became
more influential.
The Quadrennial Defense Review, mandated by Congress in 1997,
represented a preoccupation with organization and doctrine. The statute,
requiring modernization and budgeting through evaluation and planning
force structure, was announced as a dramatic departure from the past to
cope with the drastically different post-Cold War security environment.
In reality, the new reviews confirmed America’s propensity for
doctrinal redefinition, which have shifted quite abruptly since at least
World War I, to respond to funding cuts identified during such reviews
and to emphasize conventional or nuclear strategic capabilities.10
In an unprecedented move to communicate a continuation of
American policy, President Barack Obama retained Defense Secretary
Robert M. Gates from the administration of President George W. Bush.
This decision was an exceptional departure from established American
political practice regarding Department of Defense leadership and
cabinet-level positions in general. Obama’s choice encompassed policy,
executive effectiveness, and political calculation.
Gates enjoyed considerable prestige across partisan lines and, over
many years at the Pentagon and earlier as head of the Central Intelligence
Agency, demonstrated remarkable effectiveness at building support
in Congress. Gates’s standing was congruent with, and doubtlessly
reinforced, public attitudes regarding the stability of America’s security.
9      The Committee on the Present Danger gained prominence and influence, and included Paul
Nitze and others associated with previous Democratic administrations. They had moved to the right
on defense and disarmament matters. See Nicholas Thompson, The Hawk and the Dove: Paul Nitze,
George Kennan, and the History of the Cold War (New York: Henry Holt, 2009).
10      Andrew J. Bacevich, ed., The Long War: A New History of National Security Policy since World War
II (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 190.
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Despite the adroit political navigation Gates displayed, intense economic
pressures led to a comprehensive budget accord between Congress and
the White House in early August 2011 that drew attention to the large
Defense Department budget as a principal target for cuts.11
Based upon previous experience challenging strategic defense
planning while cutting specific weapons systems, Gates again shifted the
policy helm: he bluntly criticized the Pentagon for preparing for unlikely
major wars while ignoring the realistic challenges of unconventional
wars. Afghanistan provided exhibit A. Although the retention
symbolized continuity, the fundamental shift of actual defense policy
demonstrates America’s fluctuating attitude toward policy and doctrinal
changes that contrasts with Britain’s traditional ideas about engaging
military forces.12
Despite the American preference for conceptual complexity and
extremely detailed objectives replete with quantitative analysis and the
British predilection toward less conceptual precision and technological
capability, the nations have shared some strategic inclinations. Like the
democratic administration of President Barack Obama in the United
States (2009–17), the Conservative-Liberal Democrat two-party
coalition government in the United Kingdom (2010–15) reorganized
their nation’s defense forces. The successor Conservative Party
governments of David Cameron and Theresa May largely continued the
defense shifts. These initiatives reflected severe budgetary pressures as
well as other considerations. On the surface, the early British debates
regarding economic stringencies that led to “Future Force 2020,” appear
far more intense and stark than in the United States.13
The consequential cuts resulting from the British measures
significantly affected all the nation’s services. The Royal Navy, for
example, lost 5,000 sailors, 10 warships, and the fleet of Harrier jet
aircraft. The British government nonetheless planned to continue the
construction of 2 new aircraft carriers, reflecting the priority of the
maritime dimension to defense policy. Looking to the longer term,
Defence Secretary Liam Fox declared spending on military equipment
would increase by approximately £3 billion between 2015 and 2020.14 At
the same time, the important Levene Report proposed organizational
changes to foster interservice cooperation, similar to the American
innovations that granted greater authority to individual service chiefs.15
Not surprisingly, the impending cuts resulted in intense debate
and substantial criticism. The Defence Committee of the House of
Commons expressed concern about the levels of force reductions that
would result from the coalition government. The opposition Labour
11      Lori Montgomery, “National Debt Ceiling,” Washington Post, August 2, 2011.
12      Robert M. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014); and
Robert M. Gates, From the Shadows (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 143. Regarding defense
cuts, see August Cole and Yochi J. Dreazen, “Pentagon Pushes Weapon Cuts,” Wall Street Journal,
April 7, 2009.
13      “Fact Sheet 5: Future Force 2020—Summary of Size, Shape and Structure,” United
Kingdom, accessed March 21, 2018, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads
/attachment_data/file/62487/Factsheet5-Future-Force-2020.pdf.
14      Liam Fox (speech on defense transformation to the House of Commons, July 18, 2011), 531
Parl. Deb. H.C. (6th ser.) (2011), pt. 189, col. 643.
15      Peter Keith Levene, Defence Reform: An Independent Report into the Structure and Management of the
Ministry of Defence (London: Ministry of Defence, 2011).
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Party Shadow Defense Spokesman Jim Murphy declared a “strategic
shrinkage by stealth,” combining a pun related to advanced aircraft
camouflage technology with the accusation that the government had
been less than forthcoming regarding policy intentions.16
In this context, Prime Minister David Cameron’s visit to the United
States in 2012 emphasized the growing importance of these nations’
“unprecedented defense relationship that has helped secure [their]
shared interests and values since the World Wars of the last century.”
As a direct function of urgent necessity, “military interoperability and
interconnectedness” in weapons and equipment, combat operations in
Afghanistan, humanitarian relief in Haiti, joint training exercises, and
future plans continue to be central to the Anglo-American collaboration.
These collaborations, which include cyber and space along with
personnel management, training, and more general dimensions, also
reach well beyond the Atlantic region.17 Five Eyes nations significantly
benefit from the human intelligence contribution of America’s largescale resources and personnel as well as Britain’s experience and skill.
On this global scale, the similarities and contrasts between Britain
and the United States become more important, and perhaps urgent.
The contemporary Special Relationship between the two countries,
facilitated at times by good personal rapport between the British and
American heads of government, provides a general commitment to
defense and intelligence cooperation. This relational flexibility is useful
because the apparent features of national security policy and political
debates in both countries have often overshadowed long-established,
and frequently deceptive, approaches with superficial contrasts.
Historically, Britain’s orderly and sustained evolution of policies provides
not only essential strategic stability but also greater lasting impact that
complements the apparent continuity in US policies over the past two
administrations and important long-term shifts.

Ways Ahead for the Special Relationship

If Britain formally withdraws from the European Union, the
contemporary terrorist threats to Europe and the intensifying conflict
in the Middle East are the most obvious incentives to expand NATO
intelligence cooperation and integration. But there are others. As one
example, Turkey, which has the second largest land army in NATO,
has proven a reliable military ally in Afghanistan, the Persian Gulf War,
and other conflicts dating back to the Korean War. Yet that nation’s
poor human rights record and its currently confrontational autocratic
government have created frictions with both the European Union and
the United States. A reenergized NATO could more strongly encourage
the Ankara government to emulate the democratic governments and
reliable rule of law that characterize most members of the contemporary
alliance. Recent developments reconfirm NATO’s role as the principal
deterrent to Russian aggression in Europe voiced during the 2016
16      Jim Murphy, “The Beginning of Labour’s Defence Review,” Pragmatic Radicalism, March
14, 2012.
17      “Joint Fact Sheet: U.S. and UK Defense Cooperation,” White House,
March 14, 2012, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/03/14/joint-fact
-sheet-us-and-uk-defense-cooperation.
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summit in Warsaw, Poland, and expanded when Montenegro became a
new member.18
Two interrelated arenas that are not limited to the rise of international
terrorism also show promise for expanding Anglo-American cooperation: gathering intelligence and fighting low-intensity conflicts. Before
the United States became a declared combatant in World War II, military
intelligence was at the core of international collaboration. The extensive
experience Britain gained while successfully defeating insurgencies
during the Malayan Emergency (1948–60), the Mau Mau uprising in
Kenya (1952–1960), and the “Troubles” of the Northern Ireland conflict
(1968–98) improved British officials’ consciousness of the limitations
and the opportunities provided by geography, Thus, they are more ready
to negotiate.
Understanding of the use of airpower to support ground combat
operations, effective application of special operations forces, and a
healthy avoidance of the massive sustained firepower characteristic
of American combat, provides Britain with flexibility and restraint.
This approach mitigates the basic problem of counterinsurgency that
encourages brutality by blending insurgents within the wider population
and enables Great Britain to avoid the sizable quagmire the United States
experienced in Vietnam.
The value of Britain’s traditional mediating diplomatic role between
Europe and North America increases in the context of the current frictions involving President Donald Trump, German Chancellor Angela
Merkel, and others in Europe. Britain’s influence may also counter
the continuing propensity within the US military and civilian defense
establishment to undertake doctrinal and organizational shifts,
which reflects, in part, the interplay of extremely powerful interest
groups. Moreover, the British preference for keeping forces small
in counterinsurgency, and turn to diplomacy as difficulties mount,
contrasts with the US tendency to escalate firepower and increase the
numbers of forces and weapons in response to adversity. Arguably,
America’s doctrinal shifts in such situations represent a substitute for
the sort of in-depth analysis of actual war experience undertaken by
the British and evident when contrasting America’s Iraq Study Group
with the enormous research and analysis effort reflected in the British
government’s Iraq Inquiry.19
Britain has extensive experience maintaining a permanent
professional military and reconciling defense policy with interest group
politics. British empiricism, pragmatism, and avoidance of conceptual
abstraction in defense policies contrast with some American propensities. Great Britain regularly avoids turning to the American default
position of increasing firepower and troops in the field. The durable
NATO organization further facilitates such collaboration, and may
become stronger thanks to Brexit.

18      “Warsaw Summit Communique,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, March 29, 2017,
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm.
19      James A. Baker et al., The Iraq Study Group Report (Washington DC: United States Institute
of Peace, 2006); and Sir John Chilcot, The Chilcot Report: Report of the Iraq Inquiry: Executive Summary
(Kingston upon Thames: Canbury Press, 2016).
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By expanding cooperative intelligence efforts, America and Britain
can provide an important focus for future cooperation with European
nations. In specific terms, the governments of both countries should
make the Five Eyes group a higher priority in terms of both direct
involvement of senior foreign policy officials of both governments
and of the tempo of collaborative activity. Emphasis should also be on
informal collaboration among intelligence professionals at all levels,
with a focus on practical activity rather than formal organization charts
and plans. This approach is more likely to result in tangible results, and
less likely to generate media attention in times of public controversy,
to provide stronger regional, and global, security despite leaving the
European Union.

